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Abstract
I investigate the role of internal discipliners in the form of optimal equity 
ownership for the purpose of committing the management to the pursuit of 
shareholder value in the presence of separation between ownership and control. 
By rooting the conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders upon 
the control of internal funds, a simple model allows to analyse the link between 
profit uncertainty, growth options and decisional powers. I derive implications 
for the optimal degree of equity concentration, the effect of firm fundamentals 
on the allocation of income and control rights, and the pay for luck phenom­
enon. First, optimal equity ownership is positively related to the short-term 
performance of the firm and negatively related to both its growth options and 
riskiness. Second, optimal equity ownership is negatively related to the prob­
ability of the firm being financially constrained, in the sense that the level of 
desired investment exceeds internally available resources. Furthermore, I also 
show that straight debt alone does not implement the second best, in absence of 
a large shareholder. Finally, I show that, in presence of financial constraints, pay 
for luck is associated in equilibrium to a lower optimal degree of ownership con­
centration. In other words, pay for luck and looser governance, as implemented 
by the internal discipliner of equity concentration, emerge as the equilibrium 
result of a constrained incentive problem.
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1 Introduction.
The managerial corporation is the most pervasive form of industrial organiza­
tion worldwide. Virtually everywhere, notwithstanding marked cross-countries 
differences in terms of financial structure and legal framework, a crucial source 
of capital for non-financial corporations is outside equity, a large part of it typ­
ically dispersed in the hands of a multitude of small shareholders. Managers 
run the firm on a day-by-day basis with little, if any, explicit interference from 
investors. Furthermore, as a large part of the on-going investment is financed 
from cash from continuing operations, the manager enjoys a degree of discretion 
about the split of current cash-flows in pay-out and investment. Starting with 
the seminal contribution by Berle and Means (1932), the issue of the separation 
between ownership and control, and the ensuing lack of managerial commitment 
to the pursuit of shareholder value, has been the object of constant debate. A 
host of issues are constantly discussed. What are the checks and balances able 
to limit the potential for managerial misbehaviour? What is a desirable extent 
of investors control - symmetrically, of managerial discretion? What are the 
determinants of the allocation of control rights to insiders vs. outsiders?
The chance of management removal whereby a take-over from an hostile 
raider combined with the disciplining effect of market monitoring via trading in 
the firm’s stock have been widely seen as effective control mechanisms. Indeed, 
most of the research has focused on the US, where the market for corporate 
control has flourished, against the backdrop of highly developed capital mar­
kets. However, the "external" discipliner view is not entirely convincing: on a 
logical level, it requires that some external discipliner is continuously present 
during all the life of the firm. Outside the Anglo-American world, not only are 
stock markets much less developed, in terms of capitalization, liquidity, sectoral 
diversification and investor base, and therefore less reliable for the purpose of 
accurate monitoring, but the take-over threat itself seems of limited relevance 
as take-overs are much less common events. Second, even though in the Anglo- 
American world take-overs are a frequently used device to transfer ownership 
and/or control, historically they seem to appear in clusters, instead of being 
homogenously distributed over time. Finally, even in the US take-over laws 
exhibit a large degree of variability at the federal level and have been chang­
ing over time, while corporations charters often include provisions that make
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take-overs more difficult.
In parallel, the literature has also stressed the strategic role of large share­
holders for curbing managerial opportunism and therefore increasing efficiency. 
Empirically, it is usual to distinguish two models: the Anglo-American model 
relies on external/market discipliners while the Continental Europe model re­
lies on internal mechanisms based on the presence of large shareholders. In­
deed, a certain degree of concentration of ownership is the norm outside the 
Anglo-American world, where instead equity tends to be more disperse. This is 
especially true for continental Europe, markedly in France, Germany and Italy. 
However, some authors1 have challenged on the empirical side this standard di­
chotomy, showing that the presence of large shareholders in the US corporations 
is much more relevant than commonly thought.
With these considerations in the background, this paper presents a theory 
of the managerial firm abstracting from external discipliners, in order to em­
phasize the role of internal discipliners for the purpose of the maximization of 
shareholders’ value. I focus on the interplay between firm fundamentals (like 
the time pattern of profits, growth potential, riskiness, availability of internal 
cash flows), managerial incentives and the concentration of outside equity.
The driving force of our model is the well known trade-off incentives vs. 
control in presence of free cash flows. Managerial opportunism creates a time- 
consistency problem in terms of the optimal pay-out/investment rule. Ex-ante, 
the objective of value maximization makes a case for managerial extended con­
trol over short-term profits, while tighter investors’ control is the ex-post efficient 
arrangement. Hence, the efficient ex-ante pay-out policy is different from the 
ex-post rule. An appropriate control-switch mechanism is needed to strike an 
efficient trade-off between managerial initiative leading to value creation on the 
one side and rent-seeking behaviour leading to value destruction on the other 
side. Otherwise stated, investors’ effective control powers must be fine-tuned 
between the two extremes of passivity and continuous intervention, in order to 
limit managerial discretion in absence of a credible commitment to behave.
The analysis relies on five fundamental modelling hypotheses:
• short-term cash flows are subject to uncertainty beyond the control of 
economic agents (exogenous or intrinsic uncertainty)',
^ e e  Anderson and Reeb (2004, and the references therein) for evidence in this sense.
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• firm-specific non-contractible investment on behalf of management affects 
both managerial utility and long-term profitability;
• continuation project (growth option) requires further investment from in­
ternal funds, beyond the original funding provided by outside investors;
• managerial non-contractible private benefits are explicitly defined on re­
tained earnings;
• shareholders can, subject to an exogenous cost of intervention, overrule 
managerial decisions and implement their favourite policy.
The paper builds on the model developed by Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi 
(1997). Assuming non-contractible asset-specific effort and ex-ante monitoring, 
they show that a concentrated claim in the hands of a relatively large monitoring 
investor maximises the value of the firm. Given the static set-up of their model, 
when investors’ control takes the form of ex-ante monitoring, the nature of the 
claim remains ambiguous between debt and equity, as the pay-off profile is the 
same for both securities. Instead, when ex-ante monitoring is substituted by an 
interim costly intervention threat, they show that equity can be associated with 
state-contingent effective control rights, and a clear-cut case for concentrated 
equity emerges.
Compared to Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997), the novel features of our 
analysis are twofold. First, the introduction of exogenous uncertainty about 
short-term earnings captures the role of financial constraints at the reinvestment 
stage. Second, the distinction between short and long-term performance allows 
us to explicitly root the conflict of interests on the control over the internal 
funds (free cash flows) accruing to the firm in the short-run. In this respect, 
I assume that the reinvestment decision is non-contractible, thereby building 
on Myers’ (2000) insight that "verifying new investment at the moment cash is 
committed requires [...] understanding of the purposes for which cash is spent".
The first step of the analysis regards the characterization of the optimal 
contract. The second best contract is shown to display state-contingency1 of both 
security and control (intervention) rights. Furthermore, it has the nature of a 
residual claim on the value of the firm, which internalizes the effect of managerial 
incentives on the growth option and is aligned with the interest of minority
2 With respect to the source of exogenous uncertainty.
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investors. I then show that an appropriate ownership concentration of outside 
equity implements the second best contract. As standard in incentive vs. control 
theories, the trade-off leads to an equity capital structure where a relatively large 
blockholder coexists with a large number of atomistic shareholders. The large 
shareholder exerts the dividend pressure forcing the manager to stick to the 
ex-ante efficient pay-out policy. Her threat of intervention has the nature of a 
public good, due to the free riding behavior of the dispersed equity holders.
The new results and empirical predictions I derive can be classified in two 
cathegories:
• The relationship between firm fundamentals and equity ownership,
•  The pay for luck phenomenon.
The relationship between firm fundamentals and concentration.
First, the optimal concentration is (strictly) negatively related to the growth 
options of the firm and (weakly) positively related to the short-term perfor­
mance. In the model, higher growth options tilt the incentives vs. control 
trade-off towards the incentives side. It is then efficient to increase the extent 
of managerial discretion. As a result, investors’ effective control powers are 
diminished. For that purpose, concentration has to be lower, given that the 
ability to commit the management to a certain pay-out policy is increasing in 
the blockholder equity stake. In presence of a positive cost of intervention, only 
a sufficiently large claim makes credible the threat of management removal by 
shareholders. By contrast, higher short-term earnings increase the efficient pay­
out ratio and diminish the optimal degree of managerial discretion. Since the 
dividend pressure exerted by the blockholder must be higher, so must be the 
concentration.
Second, concentration is negatively related to the riskiness of the firm, as 
captured by short-term exogenous uncertainty. A low value of short-term earn­
ings may result in financial constraints on investment. In turn, the financial 
constraint has a negative effect on managerial incentives, adding risk to her 
compensation and reducing effort. When this is the case, concentration has to 
decrease in order to restore an efficient balance between incentives and control. 
Third, concentration turns out to be negatively related to the probability of 
being financially constrained.
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In summary: firms with more (less) valuable growth options should display 
lower (higher) degrees of equity concentration; firms which are more likely to 
be financially constrained should have lower concentration than comparable 
firms with less probability of financial constraints; for any firm, concentration 
increases as the expected volatility of short-term performance diminishes.
In parallel, I also show that straight debt does not implement the second 
best, in absence of a large shareholder. The result owes to the fact that debt 
does not enforce a state-contingent pay-off, in spite of conditional control rights. 
Although the framework is too stylised for a comprehensive analysis of debt, I 
also make a case for mixed capital structure: when the maximal equity stake 
of the blockholder is capped above, the second best is implemented by the 
combination of a concentrated equity claim with straight debt.
The pay for luck phenomenon.
In a study based on US corporations, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) 
provide empirical evidence of a systematic relationship between CEO’s com­
pensation and exogenous uncertainty (i.e. uncertainty beyond the control of 
economic agents). In other words, managerial compensation seems to respond 
to luck, a finding apparently inconsistent with the tenets of standard agency 
theory. They also find a negative correlation between pay for luck and mea­
sures of corporate governance, among them the presence of a large shareholder. 
The standard contracting approach posits that good governance mechanisms 
implement efficient incentive contracts which in turn rule out systematic forms 
of pay for luck. Conversely, loose governance increases the extent of manage­
rial discretion, which in turn leaves the agents free to earn extra3 rents - the 
so called skimming view. Bertrand and Mullainathan interpret pay for luck as 
prima facie evidence for the skimming view, therefore for inefficient levels of 
governance.
In our set-up, pay for luck together with looser governance, under certain 
conditions, emerges as an efficient arrangement, i.e. as a feature of the efficient 
incentive contract. Financial constraints in the form of limited cash flows avail­
able for reinvestment are the driving force behind the result. As the probability 
of financial constraints grows or, for given probability, the volatility of earnings 
gets large, it is efficient to implement a higher degree of managerial discretion,
3Extra in the sense of over and beyond the amount needed for efficient incentives.
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which translates in a state-contingent rent for the manager, in the sense that 
private benefits increase with the value of short-term earnings. I show that pay 
for luck is positively related to the growth options and to the degree of financial 
constraints (and to the volatility of earnings), while it is negatively related to 
the short-term performance. At the same time, the reverse implications hold 
for the concentration of outside equity.
As a result, a lower level of equity ownership together with pay for luck 
may be jointly an equilibrium arrangement, due to tougher incentive problems. 
This result suggests that the findings by Bertrand and Mullainathan are not 
necessarily evidence of governance failures. Rather, they can simply reflect 
contracting conditions conducive to an efficient degree of pay for luck combined 
with looser governance (reduced blockholder stake).
There is a large literature that has dealt with the disciplinary role of the cap­
ital structure and the ownership concentration. As discussed above, the most 
related work is the one by Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997). Other related 
papers are Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990) and Hart and Moore (1995), who all ar­
gue that debt, markedly short-term debt, minimize the inefficiencies related to 
project selection and solves the control problem generated by free cash flows. I 
challenge that view showing that debt fails to implement the efficient allocation 
of effective control powers at growth stage. In Zwiebel (1996), management 
chooses debt structure to promote entrenchment: dividends can be part of the 
pay-out policy when debt alone does not guarantee the minimal dynamic effi­
ciency needed to avoid dismissal. A similar view is adopted by Fluck (1999) 
and Myers (2000), who explicitly focus on equity pay-out policy: dividends 
are voluntarily set by management to the minimum level that keeps them in 
control. I follow this approach, in that dividend pressure, as implemented by 
a precise ownership pattern, acts as a commitment technology for entrenched 
management.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2 and 
the second best solution is derived in Section 3. Implementation with an equity 
claim only is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 briefly considers the role of 
debt and the case for mixed capital structure. Section 6 deals with the pay for 
luck phenomenon. The last Section summarizes the main empirical predictions. 
Longer mathematical proofs are in the Appendix.
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2 The m odel.
The model is cast in a simple framework of symmetric information and risk 
neutrality. There are two types of agents, pennyless managers and outside 
equity-holders, in turn distinguished in large and small shareholders. There are 
three dates, t =  0,1,2. Risk-free interest rates are normalised to one in both 
periods. Subjective discount factors are assumed to be one.
2.1 M anager
At t  =  0, the manager is in charge of investing in a positive NPV project, that 
delivers cash flows in the next periods. The existing technology requires the 
manager to make a costly firm-specific investment e £ [0,1] which affects long­
term performance. As a crucial assumption, effort, once exerted, is assumed 
to be sunk inside the firm, in the sense that it becomes incorporated in the 
technology open to the firm even if management is removed. Effort is observable 
but non verifiable, so that no contract can be written contingent on it.
The ex-ante utility function of the manager is defined in terms of (non trans­
ferable) private benefits stemming from long-term performance4:
b(ii) +  b(ih) e
e ' T2
where ij (j =  Z, h) is the amount of short-term cash flow not distributed and 
reinvested in the venture. Private benefits are increasing and concave in the 
amount of retained earnings available for reinvestment, i.e. b'{i) >  0, b"{i) <  0.
This specification aims to capture the nature of management interests in 
presence of separation between ownership and control. In the tradition of Hart 
and Moore, managers’ utility is proportional to the amount of resources directly 
under their control, while, at the same time, they enjoy a rent for which they 
can’t be made pay for (as in Jensen, 1986). A novel feature regards the timing. 
While effort, intended as a metaphor for the human/specific capital profused in 
the venture, is exerted ex-ante in order to boost long-term profitability, benefits
4It is assumed that managers’ monetary benefits at time 1 and 2 are fixed to a competitive 
constant wage normalized to zero. The presence of a large pool of managers offering their 
services at the competitive wage prevents the implementation of performance based rewards 
to improve on the outcome.
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appears only in the long-run, conditional on successful performance, in turn 
related to the level of effort chosen.
2.2 Technology
At t =  1, stochastic short-term cash flows y\ — {yi, y \^ yi <yh\ E{yx) =  yx} are 
realized with exogenous equal probability. Short-term performance is subject to 
a level of uncertainty beyond managerial control: however hard she can work, 
she cannot eliminate the riskiness due to macroeconomic or industry-specific 
uncertainty. Hence, she can be either lucky (y^) or unlucky (y/), independen- 
tently on her chosen course of action. Then, for each realization of yi, one of 
two mutually exclusive states of the world is publicly realized. With probability 
1 — e, where e equals the effort exerted ex-ante by the managerthere, is no con­
tinuation project available5 and the venture ends.Otherwise, with probability 
e a long-term investment opportunity (continuation project or growth option) 
arises at the end of time 1.
Depending on the amount of resources injected in the firm at this stage (z), 
the net value delivered at t =  2 is V^z) =  yiii) — i > 0 Vz. The technology 
available to the firm in the long-run, as a result of the effort profused by the 
manager, is governed by the continuous and concave function y2('). For given 
effort, ex-post NPV is maximised at i =  i such that y'2(i) — 1 =  0. After the 
realization of state e, for j  =  I, h the manager announces the payout/investment 
policy, i.e. a value ij of retained earnings to be reinvested. The difference 
dj =  yj — ij represents the payout to investors at time 1.
2.3 Shareholders
Equity-holders are interested in the security benefits from the project, i.e.
Em iV ( % ) ) K % j ) ) ] -
On the opposite angle of the separation between control and ownership, 
shareholders (ultimately the owners of the corporation) are endowed with costly 
interference powers. At time 1, when uncertainty is resolved and the the payout 
policy is announced, shareholders have the faculty to challenge the manager’s 
decision. Specifically, each shareholder can overrule manager’s payout decision,
5 Otherwise, there is a liquidation value normalized to zero without loss of generality.
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Figure 1: Time Line
and so require the ex-post efficient level of dividend, equal to dj =  yj — i. 
This intervention power, a direct prerogative of being the owners of the firm, 
comes at an exogenous cost c, taken to reflect a number of factors such as 
the legal framework, the regulation of firms’ disclosure policy, the development 
of financial markets, the transparency of the business, etc. Since the cost is 
entirely born by the challenger while the gains are shared proportionally to each 
shareholders’ stake in the firm, free riding behavior by the small shareholders 
implies that only a relatively large blockholder has effective intervention powers, 
in the sense that her threat of intervention is credible, given her share of equity. 
Therefore, the other crucial decision at time 0, together with the effort decision 
by the manager, sees the large shareholder selecting her equity stake (a) in the 
firm. Finally, at time 2, the proceeds axe realized and distributed.
The unfolding of events is represented in the time line in Figure 1.
This set-up creates a trade-off between incentives and control, much as in 
Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997), while adding the multi-period element of 
payout policy. The relevant control variable becomes the level of payout or, 
symmetrically, the level of retained earnings. This additional feature enables 
us to link the efficient policy to firm-specific characteristics, like cash flows 
volatility and growth options.
Notice that, at the inception stage, the manager enjoys full control over the 
the operations and the intermediate cash flows, since it is the unique combina­
tion of these resources with her specific skills that makes the firm profitable. 
Underlying the model, there is the idea that the contribution to the growth
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of the firm on behalf of the management tends to materialize in the long-run, 
while the short-term is subject to less controllable fluctuations. Put differently, 
as the creation of value takes time to materialize, in the meanwhile uncertainty 
can affect the project both in positive and negative ways. Long-term perfor­
mance remains only potential, to capture the unavoidable uncertainty intrinsic 
to any economic venture. For the sake of tractability, I assume that the original 
funding6 is fully embodied in the process by time 1, so that any further in­
vestment must come from the short-term earnings. The basic problem is about 
the degree of managerial discretion over the cash accruing to the firm in the 
short-run. From an ex-ante perspective, the objective of long-run performance 
(proportional to e) makes it efficient to leave extended control over short-term 
cash flows to the manager. Insofar she retains control, the pay-out decision falls 
under her discretion. However ex-post, after effort is sunk, it is optimal to set 
limits to such discretion. As a result, an optimal ownership structure strikes an 
efficient balance between the respective powers of managers and investors.
A natural question is about what specific pattern of ownership structure and 
security/control rights implements the second best.
3 The Second B est solution.
It is assumed that the maximum value exceeds the cost of investment, such 
that the venture is economically viable. At time 0, the manager maximizes her 
expected utility over e for given a. The large shareholder maximises the value 
of her share in the firm by choosing a  for given e and subject to the additional 
constraint of ex-post incentive compatibility of intervention (intervention vs. 
passivity)7. Under our modelling assumptions, I can write the problem as a
6 The participation constraint of the shareholders is not modeled. Implicitly, I assume that 
the blockholder is never wealth constrained, so that for any stake and any amount of up-front 
capital she can always provide the necessary capital. It then suffices to assume that the 
project has positive NPV at the optimal concentration, for the participation constraint of the 
shareholders to have no relevance. Though this is justified by the focus of the paper on the 
interplay between firm fundamentals and ownership concentration, the explicit introduction 
of shareholders’ participation constraint has important consequences that deserve separate 
analysis.
7 This ex-post constraint supports the equilibrium threat that guarantees sub-game perfec­
tion of the equilibrium.
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simple maximization program. The objective function is the expected value of 
the firm (shareholders’ value), maximised subject to the ex-ante incentive con­
straint of the manager and the ex-post incentive constraint of the blockholder.
I initially solve the problem without the incentive constraint of the block­
holder, in order to check later on if there is some value a  that satisfies the 
relaxed program. Formally, the relaxed problem8 is:
., max . , £yi [V (»(%)) Ie(*fe))] s
=  IS?X • , u E h  + E n  [(»(*(%)) “ *(«>)) |e(*(j?i))]o < i ( y j ) < y j - , ] = l , h
s.t.e{i(yj)) G argmaxF1,y i
Due to the binomial distribution of z/i and the separability of effort and time 
2 cash flows, I can rewrite it simply as:
max i  [Vi +  efa> *h) (V2(ij) ~  ij)] =
=  max yi +  \ e ( i t, ih) [y2{ih) +  2 /2 (*z) -  {k +  h)]
s.t.e(ih, it) G arg max *  b^hK  -  ]-e2 => e(ih, it) =  b^  ^  &^  
e l l  I
0 < k  < y r , 0  < i h <y h  
The First order conditions are:
dV
-Tjr =  b'(ii) [y2{ih) +  2/2 (*i) -  (k +  h)] +  +  b(ih)] [y'2{ii) -  1] > 0
dV
=  &'(**) [V2 (ih) +  2/2 (ii) ~ (ii +  i/J] +  [&(**) +  b(ih)] [y2(ih) -  1] > 0
Since the gradient at z =  (z, z) is positive, any possible solution entails 
i* =  (if, il) i =  (z, z). The first term on the right hand sides, always positive,
8 To rule out the trivial solution e* =  1, it is assumed emax =  <- i
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represents the value creation effect of managerial incentives. The second term 
measures the value destruction effect: for ij > i , the expressions become more 
and more negative, as a result of overinvestment beyond the zero NPV rule. 
Basically, manager and investors’s objectives are perfectly congruent, from both 
ex-ante and ex-post perspective, for ij < i. For larger values, an ex-post clash 
emerges. Notice, however, that the level of congruency of interests is not ex­
ogenous9 but depends on the available technology (2 /2 W), the manager utility 
(6(i)), and the degree of intrinsic uncertainty (f/i).
Mathematically, there exists two10 possible solutions to the program above, 
depending on parameters constellations. In the appendix I provide suitable 
conditions on the parameters such that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 depending on parameters constellations, the second best is char­
acterized as follows:
Interior Solution (I). When the gradient vanishes at an interior point,
=i*h =  i* > i  and d*h =  df +  (yh -  yi);
Constrained Solution (II).11. When i < yi < i*as obtained in (I), the 
solution attains at i* =  yi < i* ,i* < i*h < yu and d* =  0, d*h < d* -I- (yh — yi). 
Proof. See the Appendix. ■
The optimal level of investment is always higher than the ex-post efficient 
level. Over-investment is the natural result of the incentives vs. control trade­
off, under non verifiability of investment. Still, the solution depends endoge­
nously on firms fundamentals. As the value destruction effect ultimately be­
comes stronger12, I obtain either an interior or a constrained solution, depend­
ing on the magnitude of short-term cash flows.
9For instance, in Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) it is captured by an exogenous 
parameter, independent on technology and uncertainty.
10 Actually, when the gradient never vanishes at an interior point of the domain, a third 
type of solution attains, namely i f  =  yi,i% =  yh and df =  dfl =  0. However, it is of scarce 
economic interest as there is no real ex-ante incentives vs. control trade-off: the value creation 
effect dominates everywhere. Though admittedly extreme, it may describe start-up firms, for 
which growth factors such as expenditures for R&D overshadow the extent of managerial 
moral hazard. In this case, it is efficient to reinvest all available cash flows so that nothing is 
ever paid out.
11 Though qualitatively identical, I rule out the case yi <  i  as less meaningful from an 
economic point of view.
12As the difference i j  — % grows larger.
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There are two driving forces behind the state-insensitive investment policy 
and its symmetrical state-contingent dividend policy. On the one hand, the 
concavity of the continuation project over the two states of nature I and h 
calls for a state-invariant investment policy, *? =  »! =  »*>  *• On the other 
hand, the concavity of managerial utility makes the manager risk-averse over the 
investment levels. Intuitively, the optimal solution is to provide full-insurance to 
the manager, insofar it is feasible to do so (solution (I) above). Under solution
(I), risk-neutral shareholders efficiently bear all undiversifiable risk stemming 
from exogenous uncertainty, while rewarding the manager on the basis of her 
effort only. As a result, the pay-out policy acts as a shock absorber: all short­
term income volatility translates into the pay-out levels. The ex-post inefficiency 
is proportional to the distance z*—z: the more (less) important the value creation 
compared to the value destruction effect, the larger (smaller) such distance is. 
Solution (II) emphasizes the importance of cash flows uncertainty on the optimal 
policy. It is best understood by comparison with the invariant investment rule 
obtained at solution (I). When cash flows volatility is large, insufficient low 
state resources constraints the respective reinvestment below its efficient value. 
In essence, large short-term volatility of earnings imposes a financial constraint 
on the optimal course of action. Furthermore, this financial constraint creates 
a distortion in the ex-ante provision of incentives, resulting in the optimal level 
of high state reinvestment to be set above z*.
4 Im plem entation.
The analysis of Section 3 makes clear why ex-ante managerial control over firm’s 
resources is ex-ante optimal. The optimum is characterized by a reinvestment 
vector i* =  (z*, i*h) (z, z), and, symmetrically, a pay-out vector d* =  (cf,
d*h) (di, dh). Once determined the ex-ante efficient level of investment, only 
the exceeding part of short-term income has to be paid out to the investors. 
The incentives to promote long-term value are proportional to retained earnings 
available for reinvestment. The vector (z*, i*h) determines the non-contractible 
value of effort e* =  z£) =  6(*P+ftK) an(j the rent of the manager conditional
on successful performance. Hence the optimal solution is represented by the 
couple (e*,i*).
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A time-consistency problem arises, due to shareholders’ lack of commitment 
not to intervene. The manager decides her effort based on her beliefs upon the 
intervention power of outside investors at pay-out stage. Such beliefs must be 
consistent with the investment rule she chooses at time 1. But, once at pay-out 
stage, effort is sunk, and investors, if able to do so, would limit the resources 
under managerial control to z «C i*, expropriating the managerial rent. Any 
such attempt, if feasible, would be anticipated by the manager, who would in 
turn reduce her level of effort to e(z) =  b(i) < e*. Therefore, allocating ex-ante 
control to investors would reduce the intensity of the value creation effect and 
lead to a suboptimal outcome. Shareholders cannot commit to any investment 
policy larger than z: any other promise they can make to the manager is not 
credible. For the same logic, allocating formal control to the manager while 
leaving costless intervention powers to investors leads to the same suboptimal 
outcome. As laid out in the discussion above, its straightforward implication is:
Corollary 1 Setting the cost of investors intervention c — 0 does not im­
plement the Second Best, indeed:
E(VC=0) =  y i+ e(i)(y2( t) - i )  <  E(V*) =  yi+\e(i*h, q ) [y2(q) +  y2(i*h) ~ (q  +  i*h)]
The corollary simply reflects the nature of the hold up problem induced by 
the separation between ownership and control, and the lack of commitment 
thereof.
Maximization of value requires the manager to enjoy decisional powers over 
the use of internal resources. Because of this discretion, she engages in costly 
value creation activities, which in turn generate a rent. Since her contribution 
to long-term growth remains sunk inside the firm, this rent must be protected 
from investor interference, even though, ex-post, curbing managerial private 
benefits has a positive effect on the overall value. A positive cost of sharehold­
ers’ intervention exactly safeguards managerial incentives by limiting excessive 
investors’ interference. In essence, it confers effective status to the formal con­
trol allocated to the manager.
On the other hand, if the manager was left unconstrained because of loose 
investors control, ex-post she would inefficiently boost her rent expanding the 
reinvestment up to the maximum feasible value13. In this instance, the value
13 Of course, the presence of an external discipliner would set un upper bound on the
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GO Bad luck Cp=1/2)
3 M chooses dividend (d]), y-d - invest: i
4 L intervenes (if d inappropriate)
Figure 2: Events at time 1
destruction effect would dominate due to excessive investors’ passivity. To avoid 
the extreme of total passivity, the cost of intervention must then be not too large, 
as stated in the following Assumption.
A ssum ption 1 After the management has announced the pay-out policy 
and uncertainty is resolved, investors can challenge that choice at a given cost c 
such that, for any parameters constellation: 0 < c < [2/2 (2) — 2] — [2 /2 K )  — ij] =  
AF2.
The assumption simply states that the cost of intervention is smaller than 
the minimum gain from intervention, thus ruling out the extreme case of stock­
holders total passivity. For the sake of clarity, Figure 2 summarizes the events 
taking place at time 1.
Overall, a mechanism of control-switch is needed to make (e*,i*) ex-post 
enforceable. Ex-ante the manager is allocated the control over short-term cash 
flows, while a credible threat of intervention from investors must trigger inter­
ference in case of deviations from the efficient pay-out policy. As a result, the 
optimal contract specifies not only a stream of payments ( R j )  but also a pattern
maximum level of reinvestment. As the dynamic efficiency of the firm falls below a threshold, 
the conditions for a profitable hostile take-over could be satisfied. In this sense, the model I 
develop best fits a financial and institutional environment where the external threat is below 
the level that guarantees the maximization of value.
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of control rights ( C R j U )  that together support the sub-game perfection of the 
solution. On the basis of the results of Proposition 1, I can state the properties 
of the optimal contract.
D efinition. The optimal contract is a vector of income streams and a pat­
tern of control rights such that:
Ri(yi\e*) =  c? < Vi 
R\{yh,e*) =  d*h < y h
R 2 {yi\ e*) =  t/ 2  (tf)
R2{yh\e*) =  y2(i*h)
1 for Ri{yi\e*) < d*  ^ CR =  I  1 f°r R l V^h]e*^
0 for Ri(yi\e*) > dj h j  0 for R i{yh-,e*)
I can notice three main features of the optimal contract:
•  state-contingent income streams at time 1, depending on the realization 
of yi,
• conditional and state-contingent control rights at time 1;
• residual claim over time 2 value.
Such a contract shares features of real life financial contracts. Conditionality 
of control rights is normally associated with debt, where default is triggered 
when the contractually stated repayments are not met. State-contingency with 
respect to the realized cash flows is a typical feature of dividend payments on 
equity. The residuality of the claim is a typical feature of equity, as well.
I now turn to the implementation of the optimal contract. It is clear that 
the capital structure operates as a committing technology that fine tunes the 
effective control rights with the efficient pay-out rule. For our purposes, equity 
is a title to the ownership of the firm, proportional to the stake owned, which 
delivers unconditional formal control rights. However, the level of dividends 
remains a discretional choice of the management, as far as it retains control. 
Our analysis focuses on the optimal degree of concentration/dispersion of equity, 
in the hypothesis that large shareholders enjoy the same income rights of the 
small ones, even conditional on intervention.
14 CR is an indicator function that takes value 0 when the manger is unchallenged and value
1 when shareholders intervene (i.e. when they are effectively in control).
<dX
>d'h
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Proposition 2 Depending on parameter constellations, the Second Best (as 
determined by Proposition 1) is implemented by a unique equity concentration 
value:
Interior Solution (I), a* =  ||a ( i)_ q _cfe(i.)_<.1;
Constrained Solution (II). a fT15=  7—-—, r c/—  ------T <  a*.
Proof. See the Appendix. ■
The ownership stake a, selected by the blockholder at time 0, guarantees 
the credibility of the threat of intervention in equilibrium. Its value is related 
to firm fundamentals and to the ex-post gains from intervention.
Under symmetric information, shareholders’ intervention restores the ex­
post zero-NPV level of reinvestment, i, thus increasing also the pay-out up to 
dj =  dj +  (ij — i). Assumption 1 precisely states that the cost of intervention is 
smaller than the total gains. The phenomenon of free-riding is obvious. While 
the cost is born privately, the gain form intervention is shared with the other 
passive investors. In essence, the blockholder’s stake confers effective status to 
the formal control rights of outside equity-holders. The intervention constraint 
of a blockholder with a stake a  of equity capital states that the her net payoff 
from intervention, proportional to a, is equal to her payoff in case of passivity. 
Hence, only an appropriately large equity stake allows the constraint to hold. 
Notice that the gain is increasing in the investment level i*. Given that i l  >  i l  
strictly so in the case of Solution (II), it follows that that the optimal ex-ante 
concentration must be computed with respect to the high state.
Formally, the value a  needed to implement the desired solutions is implicitly 
determined by the following equation, where the left hand side is the pay-off 
upon intervention and restoration of the optimal investment rule:
a dh +  y2(i) - c  =  a[d*h +  y2(i*h) ] a  [y2(i) - i ] - c  =  [y2(i*h) -  i*h]
=* =  a ( d h )  =  a ( i * h )  =  <  1
As in Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997), the value of the firm is non­
monotonic in the concentration of equity, and attains its maximum for an inte­
rior concentration. Higher stakes have a negative impact on managerial incen­
tives, while lower stakes lead to excessive shareholder passivity, in turn allowing
15 The subscript sigma is a reminder of the effect of cash-flows uncertainty on the concen­
tration.
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the manager to appropriate resources in the pursuit of private benefits. Notice 
that intervention remains only potential, since the manager does not have in­
centives to deviate from the efficient pay-out policy. The threat of intervention 
exerted by a large shareholder translates into a dividend pressure that puts an 
efficient bound on the power conferred to the management at origination. In 
the same vein of Zwiebel (1996), Fluck (1999) and Myers (2000), management 
sets the dividends to the minimum level that allows her to retain control.
The equilibrium outside equity concentration is proportional to the pay-out 
pressure specified in the optimal contract. Firms with larger net benefits from 
managerial control should display lower concentration (higher managerial dis­
cretion) and the converse. The allocation of effective control rights, with a 
relatively large shareholder to overcome the free-riding problem, commit the 
parties to the optimal outcome. The intensity of the parties’ effective control 
rights may be different between the high and low states16: indeed, at the Con­
strained Solution (II) intervention must be triggered in the high state and not 
in the low state, where the optimal investment rule satisfies i\ =  yi.
5 D ebt vs. Equity.
In our framework, the combination of ex-ante incentives for potential growth 
and short-term uncertainty leads to a short-term claim whose payoff and control 
rights are both cash flow sensitive. The blockholder claim exhibits both features. 
What is crucial is the residuality of equity. Indeed, only a residual claim can 
satisfy the intervention vs. passivity constraint, in that its payoff is increasing 
in the amount of resources available for distribution. It is instructive to consider 
what would happen in the case when all shareholder are atomistic but short­
term debt is a feasible contract. For our purposes, debt is a claim with a fixed, 
contractually stated pay-off (interest and face value) prior to any repayment to 
equity-holders. Its control rights are conditional to the event of default.
Corollary 2 Absent a blockholder, debt alone does not implement the Second 
Best
Proof. Let D the debt repayment due at time 1 . For any value of short-term 
debt D > d f ,  pay-out is no longer state-contingent: di =  dh =  D. The expected
16 See the Appendix.
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value becomes
yi +  (1/4) [b(yi — D) +  b(yh -  D)] [y2{yi - D ) - y i  +  y2(yh - D ) - y h +  2D]
Since ih{D) =  ii(D) +  (yh ~ Vi)', then either ih(D) ^  i*h or ii(D) ^  z* or both. 
Hence, max DEyx [V" (ij(D)) \e(ij(D))] < Eyx [7 {ij{a*)) |e(2j(o'*))]. ■
A fixed debt-like claim is not flexible enough. A well known benefit of debt 
lays in its ability to force management to pay-out free cash flows, as enphasized 
by Jensen (1986). It is certainly the case in our model. However, debt repay­
ments are contractually stated: they cannot be made state-contingent on the 
realization of short-term income. As a result, for any debt repayment due at 
pay-out stage, there will be inefficiencies that prevents the implementation of 
e*. According to its level, debt acts either too soft or too tough on manager­
ial incentives. Notice that long-term debt, due at time 2, is of limited utility 
in the model, as the intervention threat must be effective at time 1 and must 
internalize the effect of investment on the continuation project.
For the sake of clarity, consider the limit case of deterministic short-term 
cash flows y i , which in turn implies a unique value d* and i*, at the interior 
solution. Now, debt can implement the optimal outcome, without any need 
for a blockholder. It suffices to set the short-term debt repayment to D* =  
d* while leaving the claim on the residual value under the form of dispersed 
equity. However, as free riding prevents small shareholders from intervening, 
the manager can trigger renegotiation, reschedule (part of) the repayment to 
debtholders to time 2 and increase her rent at the expenses of shareholder 
value. It is apparent the other drawback of debt: it fails to fully internalize the 
continuation value.
A further comment is due. If debt-holders’ intervention conditional on de­
fault is costly, for any level of debt the manager will repay an amount equal 
to face value minus the cost of intervention: then no investor will be willing to 
lend to the firm at all. Clearly, some further protection must be granted to the 
creditors to make debt feasible. A first possibility is to allow debt-holders to re­
coup the cost of intervention together with the face value17, as assumed by Hart 
(2001). Otherwise, debt-holders can have the right to dispose of certain assets 
of the firm that serve as collateral. Third, debtholders as a group can enjoy a 
veto power at the pay-out stage. In essence, for debt to be an enforceable claim
17 An equivalent option is tohave premium debt with face value B  =  D  +  c.
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it must enjoy a preferential treatment with respect to equity, which is exactly 
what happens in real life legal systems.
Altough the model is too stylized for a comprehensive treatment of debt, 
once I assume that debt financing is feasible, I can make a case for mixed 
capital structure. Denote as I  the upfront investment in the venture and W  
the maximum amount of funding that can be committed by a large shareholder. 
Furthermore, assume:
A ssum ption 2. a* > W /1 > a* ( /  — d{*) / / .
Assumption 2 states that the large shareholder’s funding is limited by a 
wealth constraint, perhaps because of the underdiversification arising from hold­
ing a large stake in the firm, or due to some form of credit markets imperfection. 
Now, a pure equity capital structure can no longer implement the optimum. The 
maximum feasible dividend pressure is too low to implement the dividend pay­
ments (d*, d*h). Introducing short-term debt relaxes the constraint, by reducing 
the amount of cash available for dividend distribution.
Proposition  3 Under Assumption 2, a mixed capital structure implements the 
second best Short-term prior risk-free debt is set to a value D* E (0, d*] such 
that a*{I -  D*) < W .
Proof. The intervention vs. passivity constraint of the blockholder is unchanged 
by short-term debt:
a* M i)  — i — D] — c =  a* [y2(i*h) -i*h - D ]
For any amount of equity funding, concentration is constant at the value 
determined by the difference in time 2 NPV [y2 (?) — &] — [2 /2  R )  — *£]• How­
ever, risk-free debt reduces the total amount of equity capital. Ultimately, given 
Assumption 2, there is a value D* E (0, djf] such that a*(I — D*) =  W . ■
Basically, short-term debt cooperates with the large shareholder claim18 in 
order to exert the efficient pay-out pressure. Actually, the leverage effect in­
creases the expected return on equity, since Re {D \q*) =  )~* 1 is
18In this instance, the enforceability of the debt claim is guaranteed by the priority rule, 
even if intervention given default is costly and no further conditions are assumed. Indeed, 
the debt claim is protected by the blockholder threat. Defaulting on debt and reinvesting the 
unpaid cash decreases the large shareholder payoff under passivity. This event automatically 
triggers the block-holder intervention, that in turn restores the debt payment as by the priority 
rule. Hence, the manager has no incentives to (strategic) default.
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increasing in D , short-term debt should be set at the maximum feasible value, 
i.e. D* =  d*t , in order to maximize the return on equity.
Therefore, as argued by Hart (2001) a mixed capital structure makes financ­
ing possible under circumstances when a pure equity capital structure does not 
make it feasible. Bearing in mind the results in Proposition 1, it is possible to 
state the following empirical prediction:
Leverage ratio is (weakly) negatively correlated with the volatility of short­
term cash flows19. Furthermore, leverage is (weakly) positively correlated with 
the amount of funding I.
Empirical studies20 provide evidence of a positive correlation between lever­
age ratios and the size of the firm. If the magnitude of I  is taken as a proxy for 
the size of the firm, our result matches the empirical findings.
Another benefit of debt lays in its ability to curb private benefits in case 
of unexpected shocks on short-term cash flows. As an illustration, consider 
a ceteris paribus decrease in low state cash flows after effort is sunk. Under 
pure equity capital structure, the manager will simply decrease one-to one the 
dividend, as the blockholder intervention vs. passivity constraint is unaffected 
from such decision. Instead, under mixed capital structure, debt would constrain 
the manager to decrease the low state reinvestment value, which is exactly the 
ex-post efficient choice.
6 Financial constraints m atter
Provided that the cost of intervention is never too large, the second best can be 
implemented whereby an appropriate pattern of equity ownership. The optimal 
concentration a* defines the ex-ante efficient vector of investment z*and pay-out 
d*, respectively larger (smaller) than the corresponding ex-post efficient values.
However, the features of the second best solution depend critically on the 
degree of exogenous uncertainty. Indeed, insofar parameters constellations are 
such that yi > z*, the only effect of uncertainty regards the pay-out policy. 
The equilibrium a* implicitly defines a state-contingent dividend pressure that 
forces the manager to pay-out all the cash in excess of the constant level of
19Ultimately, as volatility grows large and di —> 0, there is no role for short-term debt, as 
evident from Constrained Solution II.
20See, for instance, Rajan and Zingales (1995).
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investment. Uncertainty translates entirely in the pay-out levels. As for the 
manager, she is given full insurance with respect to the two states of nature / 
and j .  This is equivalent to maximal incentives for effort provision since the 
concavity of managerial utility makes her endogenously risk-averse with respect 
to the investment levels. In equilibrium she is not rewarded for luck, as agency 
theory predicts.
This is no longer the case as yi < i*, when the interior solution with full 
insurance is no longer feasible. Here exogenous uncertainty displays its full 
force by imposing a constraint on the self-financing of investment: as a result, 
the manager must bear some risk. As financial constraints bite, shareholders 
are left with the sole option of minimizing, given the technology and effort 
parameters, the extra risk added to managerial rent. The result is a higher 
value of equilibrium investment following good luck (yh) than following bad 
luck (yi), and higher than the value under the full insurance solution (I)21: 
yi =  ii < i* < i*h <  yh. As for the concentration, the equilibrium a* is set to 
a lower a a which trades-off the value creation vs. the value destruction effect 
with respect to the h state only.
In equilibrium, manager’s rent becomes state-contingent in short-term cash 
flows: the more cash is in the firm in the high state, because of sheer good 
luck, the more the manager invests. Therefore, the ultimate effect of financial 
constraints is to induce a systematic relationship between uncertainty beyond 
managerial control and compensation on the one hand and to decrease the 
equilibrium level of concentration (intervention threat) on the other hand. Still, 
it is ex-ante efficient to do so.
6.1 Pay for luck and equ ity  ownership
The interpretation I provide in this section depends on the reader’s willingness 
to consider private benefits as a legitimate form of managerial remuneration. I 
make an analogy between (increasing) private benefits and pay for luck, although 
what really matters for our purposes is that managerial discretion over the 
control of cash flows (hence her compensation) is state contingent, i.e increasing 
with short-term exogenous uncertainty.
21 For this and the following result on concentration, refer to the proof of Proposition 1, 
solution (II), in the Appendix.
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In this section I slightly modify the benchmark model, always under the 
conditions of Solution (II), namely yi < i*.
Let the probability of yh equal to p G (0,1), i.e. 1 — p  is the exogenous 
probability of being financially constrained. Notice that now E (y\,p) =  pyh +  
(1 —p)yi  ^  E(yi, 1/2) as p ^  1/2. Hence, for any couple the overall
expected value for the firm is larger (smaller) as p >  1/2 (<). I can now state 
the following proposition22:
Proposition  4 At the financially constrained Solution (II) i*(p) — yi; state h 
investment and concentration satisfy, respectively:
i*h(p) ^ ^ ( V 2) as V2,
M p ) ^ M l / 2) a s p ^ 1/2
Furthermore, i*h{p) —> i* and ol^ p ) —► a*, both from the left as p —> 1. 
Proof. See the Appendix. ■
When financial constraints are binding, pay for luck is negatively related to 
the level of expected short-term performance and positively to the probability of 
being financially constrained. Intuitively, the less valuable is the growth option, 
compared to short-term profitability, the less discretion the manager is given, 
hence less pay for luck and higher concentration.
In the model, pay for luck and looser governance, as implemented by the 
internal discipliner of equity concentration, go hand in hand. Lower concentra­
tion is the equilibrium result of a constrained incentive problem, i.e. when there 
is no room for efficient risk-sharing. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000), based 
on the tenets of agency theory, conclude that empirical evidence of pay for luck 
is a prima facie case for the validity o f the skimming view as opposed to the 
contracting view. In a nutshell, the skimming view sees CEO’s as agents with­
out principals, left free, by the inadequacy of extant governance mechanisms, 
to appropriate resources irrespective of their effective contribution to the value 
of the firm. Their conclusion seems strenghtened by their finding of a negative 
correlation between pay for luck and measures of governance, including equity 
concentration. However, I show that, under certain conditions, the negative 
correlation between pay for luck and equity concentration is itself a feature of 
the equilibrium arrangement. This finding suggests the logical chain ’’failures
22Notation follows unambigously: ihip)  and a a (p) are investment and concentration levels 
in the high state given probability p; i*.(1/2) and a a ( l /2 )  the respective values for p  =  1/2.
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of governance mechanism imply excessive managerial discretion which implies 
pay for luck” is neither necessarily true nor necessarily supportive of the skim­
ming view. Indeed, looser governance mechanisms may well be the equilibrium 
response to the characteristics of certain firms: in this sense ’’loose” stands for 
’’best”! In the light of these findings, a more powerful test of the contracting vs. 
the skimming view should focus only on those industries for which the theory 
does rule out (any extent of) pay for luck, namely those that tend not to be 
financially constrained or exhibit very low cash flow uncertainty.
7 Other results
The model generates a number of results. Some of them have already been dis­
cussed. For example, ceteris paribus, firms with higher probability of constraints 
to self-financing (low p) or, for given probability, with tighter constraints (low 
y{) have a lower degree of efficient concentration.
Now I turn to the benchmark model (p =  1/2), and consider the comparative 
statics with respect to the growth option and earning volatility.
Corollary 3. (1) A parallel shift upward (downward) of the function y2 {i) 
decreases (increases) a*: ^  < 0; the same attains for b(i): ^  < 0 .  (2) A 
mean preserving spread in the distribution of the short-term cashflows (weakly) 
decreases the optimal concentration value.
Proof. (1) Solution (I). By simple inspection of the Foe at i£ =  i* =  **f^(**) =  
§£(i*) =  bf(i*) [y2(i*) -  i*] +  b{i*) [y'2{P) -  1] =  0 I see that > 0 and ^  >  
0. The result follows as < 0 at the intervention
constraint. The same reasoning applies for solution (II), where the relevant Foe 
is §^(yifh) =  0 (eqn.2 in the Appendix).
(2) It is just a restatement of Proposition 1. As a =  (1 /2)(y^— yi) grows 
large, ultimately I end up in the case of solution (II), namely where yi — Vh~ 
2a <i* .  m
Firms with higher growth options, where future profitability is strictly finked 
to managerial effort (human capital intensive), or, generally, where the expected 
time pattern of profits is upward sloping should have, ceteris paribus, lower levels 
of optimal concentration and higher managerial discretion. This case seems to 
be relevant for innovative or high-tech firms, as well as for mature firms in
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the aftermath of a corporate crisis, when most of the value is prospective and 
stemming from the ability of the newly appointed management.
Firms whose performance is, ceteris paribus, more subject to uncontrollable 
fluctuations should have more powerful managers, smaller blockholders and ex­
hibit a higher correlation between investment and cash flows. It seems appro­
priate to include in this category firms operating in the oil and raw materials 
sectors, firms more open to foreign competition and, in general, firms with a 
core business focus, unable to reducing idyosincratic risk by pooling cash flows 
from different operating units.
Finally, notice that the model predicts the efficient pay-out ratio (dj / y j ) 
to be higher for for firms with comparably lesser growth options. This result 
seems to suggest a larger strategic role for blockholders in firms with a relatively 
constant time pattern of profits (like widely diversified groups, conglomerates, 
utilities).
8 Conclusion
This piece of work investigates the role of internal discipliners in the form of 
optimal equity ownership for the purpose of committing the management to the 
pursuit of shareholder value in the presence of separation between ownership and 
control. The analysis builds on the model developed by Burkart, Gromb and 
Panunzi (1997), who show that a concentrated equity claim maximise the value 
of the firm. I extend the original set-up (i) by explicitly rooting the conflict of 
interest between managers and shareholders on the control of internally gener­
ated cash flows and (ii) by taking into account the role of earnings volatility 
and financial constraints at growth stage. As a result, I establish a number of 
results and empirical predictions that link investment policy and optimal equity 
concentration to firm characteristics.
First, the optimal financial contract exhibits state-contingency of both secu­
rity and control rights. It can be uniquely implemented by an interior concen­
tration value. This optimal concentration is negatively related to the growth 
options of the firm and positively related to the level of short-term cash flows. 
It is negatively related to the riskiness of the firm, as captured by the volatility 
of short-term cash flows. Importantly, optimal equity ownership is negatively 
related to the probability of the firm being financially constrained, in the sense
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that the level of desired investment exceeds internal resources. I also show 
that straight debt alone does not implement the second best, in absence of a 
large shareholder. Nonetheless, under certain conditions, a combination of a 
concentrated equity claim together with straight debt is the efficient solution.
Second, when financial constraints are binding, the optimal contract is shown 
to involve a positive correlation between cash flows exogenous randomness and 
managerial utility. I interpret this finding as an optimal endogenous level of 
pay for luck, a phenomenon analysed by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000). 
Crucially, pay for luck is associated in equilibrium to a lower optimal degree of 
ownership concentration. Pay for luck is also negatively related to the level of 
short-term cash flows and positively to the probability of being financially con­
strained, while the reverse holds for concentration. In other words, pay for luck 
and looser governance, as implemented by the internal diseipliner of equity con­
centration, emerge as the equilibrium result of a constrained incentive problem. 
This finding suggests that, under certain conditions, looser governance arrange­
ments may be the equilibrium response to the characteristics of certain firms. 
Contrary to standard tenets of agency theory, in such cases loose governance 
can be an efficient equilibrium feature.
Looking forward, the predictions of the model appear worthy of empirical 
tests.
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A ppendix.
P roof o f Proposition 1.
First, in order to rule out the economically uninteresting corner solution 
{ihih) =  {yh Uh) I impose the following sufficient condition, that simply states 
that investing all resources in the h state is never optimal:
C ondition (i) V ii £ (z, yi\
dV
=  (V 2)6' ^ )  M vh )  +  V2 (ii) -  y h -  ii\Jr{l/2)[b{il)+b{yh)\ [y'2(yh) -  1] < 0.
The characterisation of the solution depends on parameters constellation. I 
show that there is either an interior solution or a constrained solution (with a 
corner solution for investment in the low), depending on the magnitude of yi 
with respect to the parameters.
Interior Solution (I). A necessary condition for the gradient of the re­
laxed Program to vanish at an interior point (z/, %h) is that simultaneously
{y2(ii) — 1 < 0 \ i i>  i.=> < .A t  this point, the First order conditions imply:y'2(ih) -  1 < o \  ih >  i
\ _  -  J] ivi ik) + V2(it) ~ (ii + ih)} [^(*/.) -  1] _  \
9{ll) =  — y(M)—  = ------------ b(il) +  b(ih) =  ~ m ~  =  9{h)
Now compute the first derivative of g{i). Over the relevant range i > i, 
negativity of [y2(i) — 1] together with concavity of y2 (z) and b (i) yields:
m m  -  jy^ i) -  !] b"(i)
It follows from the monotonicity of g'(i) over the relevant domain, that there 
is only a unique value z*that simultaneously satisfies the First order conditions, 
provided that i* < yt. To verify that =  i* =  ih is indeed a maximum, I need 
to study the sign of the Hessian determinant. The Second order derivatives are:
d2V 
-Qp =  ( l / 2)&"(*z)M^) +  2/2 M  ~ (ii +  ih)] +  b'{ii) [yf2(ii) -  1] +
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+(l /2) [b{ i l) +  b{ih)]y2{ii) < 0,V{ih ih) >  (i , i );
d2V  
~Qj2 ~ =  1/ 2)b',{ih)[y2 (ih) +  V2 {ii) -  (ii +  «/*)] +  b'{ih) [y'2{ih) -  1] +
+(l/2)[b(ii) +  b(ih)]y2(ih) < Q,V(ii,ih) >
d2V
~Q~Q^ h =  (V 2) W M  [y'2(ih) -  1] +  b'(ih) [y'2{ii) -  1]} <  0, >  (h *)•
At the stationary point i* the Hessian determinant is positive:
A(i*) =  {6"(D  -  i*] +  &'(/*) [1/2(1*) -  1] +  6(i*)i/"(i*)}2+ -  {6'(i“) [^(i*) -  l]}2 > 0.
It follows that ii =  i* =  is the unique interior solution.
Constrained Solution (II). Let i < yi < i*. Now the First order con­
ditions can no longer vanish simultaneously. Reminding that < 0, at the 
point ii =  yi, ii =  i* as obtained under the Interior Solution (I), I have that
=  ( l / 2 )b'(yi)[y2 {yi)+y2 ( n - ( y i + i * ) ] H l / 2 )[b{yi)+b(i*)] [y'^yi) -  1] > 0.
Because of the negativity of the Second order derivatives, it is optimal to 
set i*h > i*. The optimal i*h attains where the First order derivative wrt. ih 
vanishes:
Q~(yi^h) =  (1/ 2)bVh)[y2 (yi) +  y2 (j’l ) - ( y i  +  i*h)} +  [b(yi) +  b(i*h)] [y'2(i*h) -  1] =  0 
Because of Condition (i) above , i*h < yh. Notice that at (ii,ih) =  (2/z,*J),
| >  °> since sfij) <  0*
P roof o f Proposition 2.
For both cases of Proposition 1, the optimal ownership pattern implements 
the income and control rights defined in Section 3.
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Interior Solution (I). In this case, the intervention constraint of the block­
holder must be binding in both states of the world, so that the threat of in­
tervention is credible in both states. Formally, the intervention vs. passivity 
constraint must satisfy the following equations, for each realization of y\:
conditional on yi : a di -f y2(ii) — c =  a[di +  y2(^)l
conditional on yh : a dh +  y2(ih) -  c =  a  [d\ +  y2(i*h)]
Since the optimal investment policy is state-insensitive, it follows that dh — 
di =  Vh ~ Vi =  d*h — d], and the two equations collapse to the same one: 
a  [3 /2  (?) — i] — c =  a[y2(i*) — i*]. Assumption 1 guarantees a well defined con­
centration value a* = [V2 (*)-*]- [l/2 <  1.
C onstrained Solution (II). In this case, tf =  yi < i ,^ df =  0 and 
d*h =  Vh ~ i*h < (yh ~ yi)- Since investment is no longer constant over states of 
the world, the gain from intervention is now larger in state h than in state I. 
The intervention constraint must be binding only in the high state, upon the 
realization of yh, while no intervention must be triggered following the realiza­
tion of yi.The relevant constraints, conditional on the realised values yi and yh, 
become:
Vi : di +  3/2 (?) -  c < a [y2(yi)\ &  a  [y2(i) -  i] -  c < a [y2(yi) -  yi] (eqn. ii)
yh : a dh +  3/2 (?) c — ex. [d*h +  3/2 (ii)] a  [y2(?) -  i ] - c  =  a  [y2(i*h) -  ii] (eqn.
Now notice that [3 /2 (ii) — ii] < [3 /2 (yi) ~ yi]• Therefore eqn. (iii) determines
< a* <  1 such that eqn. (ii) holds withthe optimal a a =  ———, f , x— t
[ y 2 ( i ) - i ] - [ y 2 ( i h)-i*h\
strict inequality at a a.
P roof o f Proposition 4.
The Foe of the new (relaxed) Program are:
+  \pb(ii) +  (1 - p ) b ( i h)] [(1 -p) {y '2{k) ~  1)]} > 0
—  =p { b ' ( i h) [p (y2{ih) -  k ) +  (1 -  p) (y2{k) -  */)] +
+  \pb(U) +  (1 -  P)b{ih)} [Piv^h) ~  1)]} > 0
As yi < i*, where i* is the optimal investment under the Interior Solution 
(I), I obtain that |^ ( yi,ih) >  0 for any ih > i. Following the same logic of 
Proposition 1, the value ih at which |^(?//, i*h) =  0 is an i*h > i*. Then the 
monotonicity of g(i) over the relevant domain as shown in the proof of
Proposition 1, together with the trivial facts that, for any couple (k,ih) {h £)>
(a) V M b )  -  k) +  (1 -  p) ~ k) ^ (1/2) f e f e )  -  k) +  fe(*z) -  k) as 
p ^  1/2 and
(b) pb{k) +  (1 -  p)b{ih) ^ 1/2 [b{k) +  b(ih)] as p  ^ 1/2
deliver the result about ih(p)- Once characterised ih(p), the last piece of 
Proposition 4 is straightforward, according to the logic in Proposition 3.
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